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Abstract: The Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) System is a large, complex, and understudied government-
sponsored liquidity facility that currently has more than $1 trillion in secured loans outstanding, mostly to 
commercial banks and thrifts. This paper first documents the significant role played by the FHLB System 
at the outset of the ongoing financial crisis and then provides evidence about the uses of these funds by 
their bank and thrift members. We then identify the trade-offs faced by FHLB member-borrowers when 
choosing between accessing the FHLB System or the Federal Reserve’s discount window during the crisis. 
We conclude by describing the fragmented U.S. lender-of-last-resort framework and finding that additional 
clarity about the respective roles of the various liquidity facilities would be helpful. 
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The Federal Home Loan Bank System: The Lender of Next–to-Last Resort? 
I.  Introduction 
In July 2007, the credit rating agencies (Standard & Poors, Moody’s, and Fitch) 
responded to the rapid deterioration in the performance of recently originated subprime 
mortgages by taking a historical downgrade action on the entire sector of associated mortgage-
backed securities (MBS).  This downgrade had global implications.   
Many of the very largest U.S. and European financial institutions were directly exposed 
to the subprime mortgage market through loans to subprime originators, investments in the 
senior tranches of subprime MBS, and holdings of retained tranches of collateralized debt 
obligations (CDOs); the latter of which was largely secured by the subordinate tranches of 
subprime MBS.  These same institutions were also indirectly exposed through their sponsorship 
of structured investment vehicles (SIVs) and asset-backed commercial paper conduits (ABCP 
conduits), which purchased subprime MBS, as well as through exposures to their trading 
counterparties who had similar problems.   
The ratings action also triggered a loss of confidence by investors in a broad array of 
structured finance products.  Related selling and hedging activity put additional downward 
pressure on the prices of a broad range of asset-backed securities.  Mark-to-market accounting 
rules, in turn, resulted in the recognition of large accounting losses and a material deterioration in 
capital positions for the exposed institutions.  Uncertainty about the ultimate level of exposure 
faced by individual institutions prompted money market investors to reduce their exposure to any 
entity which might have exposure; thereby leading to a sharp increase in the cost and a 
significant reduction in the availability of term funding.  This stress in term funding markets was 
key because the inability of institutions to access term credit -- concurrent with the breakdown of 
the originate-to-distribute model of financial intermediation that left them with unexpected assets   2
on their balance sheets -- would impair the ability of these institutions to originate new credit and 
amplify the effect of the correction in the housing and mortgage markets. 
When faced with such liquidity shocks, conventional wisdom holds that a government-
sponsored liquidity provider (e.g., the central bank) should be available to act as a lender of last 
resort.
1 Over the last year, the Federal Reserve has indeed played the role of a lender of last 
resort and has provided substantial amounts of liquidity to the financial system.  However, at the 
outset of the liquidity crisis, the Federal Reserve saw little demand for primary credit through its 
Discount Window -- even after lowering the discount rate from 100 basis points to 50 basis 
points above the Federal Funds target.
2  Some observers attributed the lack of Discount Window 
lending during this period to the notion of there being a ‘stigma’ to such borrowing insofar as it 
would send an adverse signal about the financial viability of the borrower.  However, the lack of 
borrowing from the Discount Window can also be explained by the presence of an alternative, 
lower cost government-sponsored liquidity backstop: The Federal Home Loan Bank System 
(FHLB System).  
The FHLB System is a large, complex, and understudied U.S. government-sponsored 
enterprise (GSE) that was created in the midst of the Great Depression. This housing GSE 
consists of 12 cooperatively owned wholesale banks that act as a general source of liquidity to 
over 8,000 member financial institutions, which are commercial banks, thrifts, credit unions, and 
                                                 
1 Frexias, Giannini, Haggarth, and Soussa (1999) define the role of the lender of last resort to be “the discretionary 
provision of liquidity to a financial institution (or the market as a whole) by the central bank in reaction to an 
adverse shock that causes an abnormal increase in the demand for liquidity which cannot be met by an alternative 
source.” While history provides some examples of the lenders of last resort being private entities (e.g. clearing 
houses in the United States prior to the establishment of the Federal Reserve) or even private individuals (J.P. 
Morgan in 1907), we consider the lender of last resort to be either part of the government or operating with explicit 
or implicit governmental backing. 
2 The Discount Window is historically the principal mechanism through which the Federal Reserve performs its 
lender of last resort function.  The Discount Window is considered to be a “Lombard Facility” – meaning that 
eligible depository institutions can freely access central bank credit at a penalty rate with appropriate collateral.  The 
Discount Window began operating this way in 2003.   3
insurance companies.  This liquidity is primarily provided through “advances” or (over) 
collateralized lending to members.  During the second half of 2007, the FHLB System increased 
its advance lending by $235 billion to $875 billion by the end of that year (a 36.7% increase). 
And ten FHLB members alone accounted for almost $150 billion of this new advance lending. 
Advances have continued to grow into 2008, albeit at a slower rate, and stood at $914 billion as 
of June 30, 2008.  
Interestingly, the re-intermediation of credit through the FHLBs during the fall of 2007 
was quite different from what occurred during the last major global liquidity event: the Asian 
financial crisis.  During the fall of 1998, money market investors ran from short-term paper 
issued by the corporate sector and deposited their funds with the banking system.  Banks, in turn, 
re-lent those funds to corporations through backup lines of credit (e.g., Gatev, Schuermann and 
Strahan 2005).  By contrast, during the recent liquidity stress, money market investors ran away 
from debt issued or sponsored by depository institutions and into instruments guaranteed 
explicitly or implicitly by the U.S. Treasury.  By issuing implicitly guaranteed debt, the FHLB 
System was able to re-intermediate term funding to member depository institutions through 
advances. 
However, it became clear in December 2007 (and again in March 2008) that the response 
of the FHLB System was not enough to ease all of the stress in term funding markets.   
Institutions ineligible for FHLB membership, such as foreign banks and primary dealers, 
continued to have significant demands for term dollar funding and were not borrowing from the 
Federal Reserve.  In response, the Federal Reserve introduced several new liquidity facilities   4
aimed at reducing funding pressures.
3  During the recent financial crisis, the liquidity facilities of 
the Federal Reserve and the FHLB System have at the same time complemented and competed 
with each other. The FHLB System took the early lead, and it was not until March 2008 that the 
Federal Reserve became the largest government-sponsored liquidity facility in terms of crisis-
related lending to the financial system.  Hence, we view the FHLB system as the lender of next 
to last resort. 
The objective of our paper is three-fold.  First, we seek to document and understand the 
role played by the FHLB System in the ongoing financial crisis. To this end, we provide a brief 
overview of this larger sibling to the more well-known housing GSEs: Freddie Mac and Fannie 
Mae.  We then document FHLB advance activity during the second half of 2007 and analyze 
how these funds were used by commercial banks and thrifts.   
Second, we want to understand the interplay between the liquidity facilities provided by 
the FHLB System and the Federal Reserve, respectively.  We do so by comparing quantities and 
prices.  As a general reluctance to lend among private agents emerged at the outset of the crisis, 
the FHLB System became an attractive source of funding as investors placed a premium on the 
implicit government backing of their debt.  Despite substantial cuts in the Federal Reserve’s 
discount rate relative to the federal funds target, the FHLB System continued to see strong 
demand for advances through the end of 2007.  However, following heightened concerns about 
the financial health of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the second quarter of 2008, the FHLB 
System found itself “guilty by association” and saw its borrowing costs (and hence advance 
                                                 
3 As of August 31, 2008, these new facilities included: Term Discount Window (TDW), Term Auction Facility 
(TAF), swaps with the European Central Bank and the Swiss National Bank, single-tranche open market operations 
(Single-Tranche OMOs), Term Security Lending Facility (TSLF), Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), and Term 
Securities Lending Facility Options Program (TOP).   5
rates) rise and availability of term funding limited.  As a result, the Discount Window became a 
more attractive option in terms of pricing and saw some increase in borrowings.   
Finally, we wish to draw insights and lessons from this episode in order to frame a 
discussion for how to think about the lender of last resort role in a modernized financial 
regulatory structure.  While the Federal Reserve has eclipsed the FHLB System in terms of total 
lending during the crisis, the FHLB System has been the largest lender to U.S. depository 
institutions and much of the Federal Reserve’s liquidity operations have been for the benefit of 
non-depository or foreign financial institutions.  Moreover, had U.S. depository institutions 
turned to the Federal Reserve’s Discount Window instead of the FHLB System, the amount of 
unencumbered outright holdings of U.S. Treasury securities on the Federal Reserve’s balance 
sheet would have been below $100 billion (as of August 31, 2008); assuming that all credit 
would have been forthcoming and sterilized.  Ultimately, it was concerns about the Federal 
Reserve’s ability to further address financial market strains without affecting its monetary policy 
stance that led to the Supplementary Financing Program and the statutory authority to pay 
interest on reserves three years ahead of the original schedule.  Notably, however, developments 
in the Federal Agency debt market during 2008 have demonstrated the limitations of relying on a 
lender of last resort with only implicit government guarantees.  As with Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac, debt spreads for the FHLB System widened significantly and the availability of long-term 
funding became limited. 
The organization of the paper closely follows these objectives.  We begin with an 
overview of the FHLB System, continue with an analysis of the uses of FHLB advances during 
the recent stress, and then provide a detailed comparison of the liquidity facilities of the FHLB 
System and the Federal Reserve.   6
II.  The Federal Home Loan Bank System 
The FHLB System is composed of 12 regional Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs) and 
an Office of Finance that acts as the FHLBs’ gateway to the capital markets.  Each FHLB is a 
separate legal entity and has its own management, employees, board of directors, and financial 
statements.  FHLBs are cooperatively owned by its member commercial banks, thrifts, credit 
unions, and insurance companies headquartered within the distinct geographic area that the 
FHLB has been assigned to serve.  Members must either maintain at least 10 percent of their 
asset portfolios in mortgage-related assets or be designated as “community financial 
institutions.”
4  The FHLB System was originally created in 1932 to primarily serve the thrift (or 
savings and loan) industry, which at that time did not have access to the Federal Reserve’s 
Discount Window.
5,6 In 1989, following the savings and loan crisis, FHLB membership was 
expanded to include commercial banks and credit unions.  As of year-end 2007, the FHLB 
System had 8,075 financial institution members – 87% of which were commercial banks or 
thrifts. 
  Table 1 presents the relative sizes (in terms of total assets) and numbers of members for 
each of the 12 FHLBs as of December 31, 2007.  The FHLB of San Francisco is by far the 
largest institution ($323.0 billion), accounting for almost a quarter of the FHLB System's assets.  
The FHLBs of Des Moines and Atlanta each have 15% of the total FHLB System membership.  
By contrast, the table also shows the extent to which each bank's business is dominated by its 
                                                 
4 “Community financial institutions” are defined at 12 U.S.C. § 1422(13). 
5 In the Presidential statement about the signing of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act in 1932, Herbert Hoover noted 
that: “Its purpose is to establish a series of discount banks for home mortgages, performing a function for 
homeowners somewhat similar to that performed in the commercial field by the Federal Reserve banks through their 
discount facilities.”  See: < http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=23176>. 
6 The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 opened the Discount Window to all 
banks, savings and loan associations, savings banks, and credit unions holding transactions accounts and non-
personal time deposits.   7
largest members.  The percentage of each bank's advances (loans to members) that is accounted 
for by its five largest users range from 42.1% (the FHLB of Chicago) to 79.0% (the FHLB of 
San Francisco).
7 
  The FHLB System is often viewed as a whole because virtually all FHLB financing takes 
the form of consolidated obligations for which the 12 institutions are jointly and severally liable.  
Hence, Table 2 shows the consolidated balance sheet of the 12 FHLBs, as of December 31, 2007.  
Advances constitute 68.7% of the FHLB System's $1,274.5 billion in total assets; cash and 
investments another 23.4%; and holdings of residential mortgages are 7.2% of total assets.  On 
the liability side of the balance sheet, consolidated obligations constitute 92.5% of total assets.  
The FHLB System's capital is only 4.2% of assets, and almost all of that is the members' 
contributed capital; retained earnings are only 0.3% of assets.  The FHLB System is thus a very 
large and highly leveraged financial institution. 
  The FHLB System is considered a government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) since it has 
been expressly created by an Act of Congress (The Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932) that 
includes several institutional benefits designed to reduce their operating costs.  In this way, the 
FHLB System is similar to the other two housing GSEs – Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  Certain 
charter provisions combined with past government actions, have created a perception in financial 
markets that GSE obligations are implicitly guaranteed by the federal government.
8  This, in 
turn, allows these institutions to finance their activities by issuing debt on more favorable terms 
                                                 
7 Similarly, the percentage of each bank's capital that is accounted for by its five largest members ranges from 30.0% 
(the FHLB of Chicago) to 74.9% (the FHLB of San Francisco). 
8 Special privileges accruing to the FHLB System include: a provision authorizing the Treasury Secretary to purchase up 
to $4 billion of FHLB securities; the treatment of FHLB securities as “government securities” under the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934; the statutory ability to use the Federal Reserve as its fiscal agent (like the Treasury); and an 
exemption from the bankruptcy code by way of being considered “federal instrumentalities”.   8
than any AAA-rated private corporation.
9 Housing GSEs also accrue cost savings through an 
exemption from federal corporate income taxes and an exemption from Securities and Exchange 
Commission registration requirements for their debt securities.  Key differences between the 
FHLB System and Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac relate to their primary functions (collateralized 
lending via advances versus issuing credit guarantees on mortgage-backed securities) and 
ownership structure (cooperative versus publicly held corporations).  The $1.3 trillion in total 
assets controlled by the FHLB System as of June 30, 2008 exceeded those for Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac at that time ($886 billion and $879 billion respectively).
10  
It is understood that explicit or implicit government guarantees of financial institution 
liabilities will distort the risk-taking incentives of the insured institutions in a way that increases 
the probability of financial distress.
11  Recognizing this potential moral hazard, the federal 
government regulates the FHLB System for “safety and soundness” through the Federal Housing 
Finance Agency (FHFA), which also has responsibility for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  The 
FHFA is an independent agency within the executive branch that was created in July 2008 with 
the passage of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008.  Previously, the Federal 
Housing Finance Board had sole responsibility for supervising the FHLB System.  Like other 
financial regulators, the FHFA is authorized to set capital standards, conduct examinations, and 
take certain enforcement actions if unsafe or unsound practices are identified.
12 
                                                 
9 See Ambrose and Warga (1996, 2002), Nothaft, Pearce, and Stevanovic (2002), and Passmore, Sherlund, and Burgess 
(2005). 
10 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac also maintain large volumes of credit guarantees on mortgage-backed securities.  
These guarantees (net of securities held on their own balance sheets) totaled $2.3 trillion (Fannie Mae) and $1.4 
trillion (Freddie Mac) as of June 30, 2008.  
11 Flannery and Frame (2006) identify and analyze FHLB System risk-taking incentives and compare them to those 
faced by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 
12 The regulations currently applying to the FHLB System are those previously promulgated by the Federal Housing 
Finance Board.  These regulations are codified at 12 C.F.R. § 900-999.    9
The stated public purpose of the FHLB System is to provide their members with financial 
products and services, most notably advances, to assist and enhance the members’ financing of 
housing and community lending.
13  One important empirical question relates to what types of 
assets FHLB advances ultimately fund on member balance sheets.  While members must post 
collateral to secure their advances and that collateral is typically residential mortgage-related (whole 
loans or mortgage-backed securities), money is fungible; there is no reason why the members would 
necessarily use the borrowed funds for further housing loans or other designated uses.  Indeed, 
empirical evidence provided by Frame, Hancock, and Passmore (2007) suggests that FHLB 
advances are just as likely to fund other types of bank credit as to fund residential mortgages.   
Another important question relates to whether the benefits of FHLB membership flow to 
members and, if so, whether it flows further still to consumers – especially mortgage borrowers.  
In one study, the U.S. Congressional Budget Office (2004) estimated that the FHLB System 
accrued $3.4 billion in implicit federal support in 2003 and that $0.2 billion of that accrued to 
conforming mortgage borrowers while the remainder was captured by various FHLB 
stakeholders.  Presumably, most of these benefits accrue to the FHLBs member-owners who, in 
turn, pass them on to their customers.  However, some benefits may be captured by FHLB 
management and shareholders.  A more comprehensive analysis of the distribution of FHLB 
benefits would be a welcome addition to the literature.   
 
III.  The Role of FHLB Advances during the 2007 Liquidity Crisis 
Advances are historically the primary activity conducted by the FHLBs. These loans are 
generally collateralized by residential mortgage-related assets (whole loans and mortgage-backed 
                                                 
13 See 12 U.S.C. § 1430(a)(2). 
   10
securities) and U.S. Treasury and Federal Agency securities.
14  Beyond the explicit collateral and 
a member’s capital subscription, the FHLBs also have priority over the claims of depositors and 
almost all other creditors (including the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, or FDIC) in the 
event of a member’s default; this is often described as a “super-lien.”
15  Taken together, these 
features help to explain why none of the FHLBs has ever suffered a loss on an advance.   
Unfortunately from a public policy perspective, the combination of over-collateralization 
and the super-lien can create an incentive for the FHLBs to provide their members with more 
credit than is socially optimal.  This is due to the fact that these provisions reduce the FHLBs’ 
incentives to screen and monitor their members and the pledged collateral.  This arrangement 
also serves to weaken the claims of existing private creditors and expose the FDIC to increased 
losses in the event of failure (Stojanovic, Vaughan and Yeager 2008). Consistent with the 
potential for excessive lending, the FHFA (as previously established by the Federal Housing 
Finance Board) does not impose loan to one borrower limits on the FHLBs; and that individual 
FHLB internal limits (when imposed) are generally set in the range of 30 - 50 percent of member 
total assets. By contrast, national banks limit loans to one borrower at 25 percent of bank total 
equity (with not more than 15 percent of bank equity being unsecured).
16 
FHLB advances are generally viewed as an attractive source of wholesale funds.   
Advance interest rates are set by the individual FHLBs and reflect a mark-up to the cost of 
Federal Agency debt funding secured by the Office of Finance.  However, in order to receive an 
advance, a member must also purchase FHLB stock in an amount ranging from 2-6 percent of 
the advance (as dictated by the individual FHLB’s capital plan).  While FHLB stock typically 
                                                 
14 See 12 U.S.C. § 1430(a)(3) for a complete list of eligible collateral.  Federal Agency securities are generally 
synonymous with debt and mortgage-backed securities issued by government sponsored enterprises. 
15 See 12 U.S.C. § 1430(e). 
16 See 12 U.S.C. § 84(a) as this applies to national banks.   11
pays a dividend, to the extent this pay-out falls below the members’ marginal investment 
opportunity the stock purchase requirement can create an opportunity cost.  Generally speaking, 
there is an inverse relationship between advance rates and dividend rates across FHLBs; with 
differences presumably reflecting efficiencies and the collective preferences of the membership.  
Advances grew rapidly during the 1990s and early 2000s following the introduction of 
commercial banks as FHLB System members.  However, from the end of 2005 through the first 
half of 2007, the level of outstanding FHLB advances oscillated within a narrow range of $620 
to $640 billion (see Figure 1).  The amount of outstanding advances ticked up slightly in July 
2007, but then exploded during August and September -- moving from $659 to $824 billion (a 
25% increase).  FHLB advances stood at $875 billion at the end of 2007 – an amount equivalent 
to 6.2% of U.S. gross domestic product.   
During the second half of 2007, the ten most active members accounted for almost $150 
billion of the $235 billion increase (63%).  Table 3 shows that Washington Mutual, Bank of 
America, and Countrywide borrowed the largest amounts from the FHLB System during this 
period; and for Washington Mutual and Countrywide their ratios of advances-to-total assets rose 
to 20 and 40 percent, respectively.  Notably, four of the ten institutions have subsequently failed 
or been acquired. 
As liquidity pressures developed during the fall of 2007, FHLB advances became an 
attractive source of funding in terms of pricing.  During this time, investors sought the protection 
of (explicitly or implicitly) federally guaranteed obligations and FHLB funding costs declined 
relative to other benchmarks like LIBOR and AA-rated asset-backed commercial paper. For 
example, the average spread between one month LIBOR and four week FHLB discount notes 
increased from about 16 basis points prior to the turmoil to 44 basis points during the following 
12 months.  By contrast, the average spread between a 30-day advance from the FHLB New   12
York and four week FHLB System discount notes has remained unchanged at about 25 basis 
points (see Figure 2). 
Much of the growth in FHLB advances in the second half of 2007 reflected longer-term 
lending, although the GSE financed this growth primarily by issuing short-term liabilities.  Of 
the $235 billion increase in FHLB advances during the second half of 2007, $205 billion carried 
an original maturity of greater than one year (87.4%).  By contrast, over the same period, 
discount notes with maturities of less than one year increased by $213 billion comprising 94.2% 
of net new FHLB consolidated obligations.
17  We believe that this stark mismatch reflected the 
market stress during this period.  For example, anecdotal evidence suggests that many depository 
institutions sought term funding for loans originally intended to be securitized but that were 
unable to be moved off-balance-sheet.  On the other hand, investors shunned ABCP issuers and 
instead sought the safety of short-term U.S. Treasury and Federal Agency debt securities. 
In order to better understand why financial institutions markedly increased their 
borrowing from the FHLBs during the second half of 2007, we take two approaches.  First, we 
analyze aggregate growth within the balance sheets of banks and thrifts by comparing this period 
to the trend in the six quarters preceding the crisis.  Second, we take a statistical approach, 
documenting how the correlation between the changes in FHLB advances and changes in other 
balance sheet items varied during the last two quarters of 2007 relative to the benchmark of the 
previous six quarters. 
A.  Aggregate Balance Sheets 
We start by aggregating the Call Reports of both commercial banks and thrifts over three 
time periods: the six quarters before the recent financial crisis, 2006:Q1-2007:Q2 (our 
                                                 
17 Discount notes are generally sold in sizes ranging from $500 million to over $5 billion each; with typical 
maturities being overnight, 4-, 9-, 13-, and 26-weeks.     13
benchmark), and each of the two quarters following the onset of the crisis 2007:Q3 and 
2007:Q4.
18  In order to capture differences across institutions of different sizes, these aggregates 
are broken out using a threshold of $5 billion in total assets.  “Large institutions,” or those with 
greater than $5 billion in total assets, accounted for 80 percent of FHLB advances outstanding as 
of December 31, 2007. 
Table 4 documents the aggregate behavior of large and small depository institutions over 
the three time periods (Panels A-C).  For each line item, the table reports the aggregate 
percentage of the item relative to total assets in the last quarter, the percentage change over the 
quarter, and the change in the ratio of the item to total assets measured in percentage points.   
We begin our discussion focusing on the behavior of large institutions during the third 
quarter of 2007 (Panel B).  Most striking is the 31.7% increase in FHLB advances compared to 
the average quarterly growth rate in this balance sheet item of 0.4% over the previous six 
quarters reported in Panel A.  The overall increase in “other borrowing,” of which FHLB 
advances are a part, more than offset a decline in federal funds and repo borrowing by large 
institutions.  This suggests that FHLB advances were used, in part, to mitigate a funding shock.  
While deposit growth was slow (2.1%) relative to growth in total assets (4.0%), it was slightly 
higher than the average deposit growth over the previous six quarters (1.8%).  This suggests that 
funding pressures faced by large institutions were largely isolated to federal funds and repo 
borrowing.   
On the asset-side, large institutions also reduced their cash holdings (relative to total 
assets) during the third quarter of 2007 – consistent with funding stress.  Asset growth during 
2007:Q3 for these institutions largely came from federal funds and repo lending as well as 
                                                 
18 The bank and thrift Call Reports do have some minor differences and we have worked to keep categories 
comparable and thereby minimize distortions.     14
trading assets.  Large institutions also experienced a modest increase in total loans (3.4%), which 
was faster than the baseline average quarterly growth rate of 1.5% (Panel A).  This acceleration 
largely came from non-mortgage loans; likely the result of draws on outstanding lines of credit.  
The increase in trading assets is consistent with large institutions using FHLB advances in order 
to fund mortgage loans in the securitization pipeline that were unexpectedly retained on the 
balance sheet due to the breakdown of the originate-to-distribute model.
19   
One possible explanation for the increase in federal funds and repo lending during 
2007:Q3 is that a number of institutions were granted exemptions from Section 23A of the 
Federal Reserve Act, which restricts lending to affiliates, in order to allow commercial banks to 
support their affiliated broker-dealers.
20  We investigated this explanation by comparing the 
increase in repo lending on the bank and thrift Call Reports with similar lending on the holding 
company’s Y-9C, for the subset of U.S. institutions where such information is available.  As 
lending from a bank to its affiliate would not appear on the consolidated balance sheet, this 
should provide indirect evidence on the importance of changes in inter-bank lending.  The 
evidence suggests that this phenomenon only explained a small part of the increase in federal 
funds and repo lending.  Hence it appears that large institutions were using FHLB advances to 
help fund assets more generally.  In this way, the FHLBs appear to have been performing as a 
typical lender of last resort; providing liquidity to depository institutions that, in turn, provided 
liquidity more broadly to the rest of the economy. 
                                                 
19 The Call Reports of Income and Condition did not break out mortgage loans from other items in the Trading 
Account until March 2008, making it difficult to document this hypothesis. 
20 Exemptions were granted on August 20, 2007 for Citigroup, Bank of America, and JP Morgan Chase.  Later in the 
third quarter of 2007, similar exemptions were granted for the New York branches of Deutsche Bank AG, Royal 
Bank of Scotland PLC, and Barclays Bank PLC.  These exemptions were announced on the public web site of the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve <www.federalreserve.gov>.   15
The data in Panel B also documents a significant increase in FHLB advances during 
2007:Q3 for small financial institutions, or those with less than $5 billion in total assets.  This 
appears to largely have been to offset slow deposit growth (relative to the baseline period).  The 
growth in the assets of small institutions (1.7%) was slightly below average over the previous six 
quarters.  One interpretation of this fact is that funding pressure was constraining balance sheets, 
but another is that small institutions reduced their demand for funding as they tightened 
underwriting standards.  The outright decline in cash and the acceleration in the growth of 
federal funds and repo borrowing would appear to support the former explanation.  Moreover, it 
is interesting to note the significant decline in federal funds and repo lending, suggesting that 
small institutions were part of the investor class exiting secured funding markets.  As reducing 
the level of inter-bank lending is cheaper than increasing the level of inter-bank borrowing, this 
is also consistent with small institutions facing funding pressures. 
Panel C documents the aggregate behavior of banks and thrifts during the fourth quarter 
of 2007, with a similar format to the first two panels.  While the asset growth of large institutions 
slowed to 2.6%, it remained above the mean growth rate of the six pre-crisis quarters.  And the 
growth in FHLB borrowing by large institutions was only modestly faster than that of total 
assets.  This faster growth in assets is largely explained by the same sources from the third 
quarter: federal funds and repo borrowing, trading assets, and non-mortgage loans.  Small 
institutions appeared to be under continued pressure in the fourth quarter, as deposit growth was 
slow relative to pre-crisis averages, federal funds and repo borrowing as well as FHLB 
borrowing expanded quickly, and federal funds and repo lending continued to contract. 
Overall, the aggregate data suggest that both large and small institutions used FHLB 
advances during the second half of 2007 in order to smooth a liquidity shock.  However, large   16
institutions also used advances to fund increases in the trading book, federal funds and repo 
lending, and non-mortgage lending. 
B.  Regression Analysis 
So far, our approach has been descriptive, but now we turn to some statistical analysis.  
In particular, we examine the correlation between changes in FHLB advances at the bank- and 
thrift-level and changes in their other balance sheet categories during the second half of 2007.  
Specifically, we estimate an OLS regression of the quarterly change in FHLB advances on 
similar changes in: cash holdings, federal funds and repo lending, trading assets, funding (the 
sum of total deposits, federal funds borrowing, and repo borrowing), mortgage loans, non-
mortgage loans, each scaled by the previous quarter’s total assets.  Given the heterogeneity 
documented above for large and small institutions, each of these variables is interacted with a 
dummy variable indicating a large institution.  The specification is estimated over each of three 
samples: the six quarters before 2007:Q2, 2007:Q3, and 2007:Q4. 
  The first column in Table 5 documents the “normal” correlation between changes in 
FHLB advances and changes in the various balance sheet categories for the six quarters before 
the crisis.  While changes in advances are correlated with changes in federal funds and repo 
lending for small institutions (Line 4) with an estimated coefficient of 0.385 (significant at the 
1% level), the correlation for large institutions is close to zero with an estimated implicit 
coefficient of 0.385+(-0.317) = 0.068. There is a strong correlation between changes in FHLB 
advances and changes in both mortgage loans and non-mortgage loans for small institutions, but 
a much weaker one for large ones.  Finally, small banks and thrifts appear to use FHLB advances 
to smooth changes in funding, while large institutions are less dependent on advances for this 
purpose.   17
The second column of Table 5 documents how these correlations changed during the 
third quarter of 2007.  While we established above that changes in the federal funds and repo 
lending of large banks and thrifts were not related to changes in FHLB advances pre-crisis, a 
strong positive relationship appeared during 2007:Q3 as the correlation becomes positive and 
statistically significant (0.433 + 0.150 = 0.583).  There was also an increase in the correlation 
between changes in FHLB advances and changes in trading assets for both large and small 
institutions, but not a differential increase.  While there is a modest increase in the sensitivity of 
changes in mortgage loans to changes in advances for small banks and thrifts, there is a 
significant increase in the sensitivity for large institutions.  On the other hand, while the positive 
relationship between changes in FHLB advances and changes in non-mortgage loans got stronger 
for small banks and thrifts, it actually got weaker for large institutions to the point of becoming 
negative (0.566 – 0.770 = -0.204).  Finally, while there was only a modest increase in the use of 
advances to smooth funding for small banks and thrifts (the coefficient became slightly more 
negative), a significant increase was apparent for large ones as the implied coefficient for these 
institutions became significantly more negative (from -0.451+0.231 = -0.220 to -0.508 + 0.007= 
-0.501).  
  The last column of Table 5 documents how the balance sheet correlations changed during 
the fourth quarter of 2007 relative to the baseline.  For each category, there appears to be a return 
towards pre-crisis patterns, as the correlations of small institutions -- which had increased in the 
third quarter -- fell back and the correlations for large institutions reverted to pre-crisis signs and 
magnitudes. This convergence in correlations between the change in FHLB advances and 
changes in other balance sheet items may have interesting implications for the impact of the 
turmoil in the term funding markets played on loan originations.  In particular, if limited access 
to term funding was constraining the ability of institutions to originate loans, one might expect   18
these elevated correlations to persist.  In other words, they would have simply continued to 
access term funding from the FHLB System.  This suggests that FHLB advances were used to 
smooth a large one-time shock; and that the willingness of banks to lend -- and not term funding 
pressure – subsequently became the binding constraint on the origination of new loans.  
 
IV.  Crisis-Related Lending by the Federal Reserve and the FHLB System 
During the 2007-08 financial crisis, the liquidity facilities of the Federal Reserve and the 
FHLB System seem to have both complemented and competed with each other.  Below, we 
analyze prices and quantities in order to gauge the relative magnitude and importance of the 
crisis-related lending from the two institutions.
21 We focus on four distinct parts of the crisis: the 
initial shock in August 2007; the introduction of the Term Auction Facility (TAF) and swap lines 
with foreign central banks in December 2007; the introduction of Primary Dealer Credit Facility 
(PDCF) and Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) in March 2008; and the heightened 
concerns about the financial health of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in July 2008.  
Figure 3 illustrates the crisis-related lending the Federal Reserve and the FHLB System 
over the 32 months ending June 30, 2008.  For the Federal Reserve, we present both total 
Discount Window lending as well as total liquidity provided to the financial system, which is the 
sum of cash (Discount Window) and securities lending. (Figure 4 then provides a lending 
breakdown by credit facility.)  During the first four months of the liquidity crisis, the FHLB was 
clearly the dominate source of government-sponsored liquidity.  It was not until December 2007 
that the Federal Reserve began to lend significant amounts, as a result of the introduction of the 
TAF and swap lines with foreign central banks.  The figure also documents that the Federal 
                                                 
21 Usage alone might be a misleading measure of the impact of a liquidity backstop facility as the option of being 
able to use such a facility is valuable in its own right.    19
Reserve did not eclipse the FHLB System in terms of crisis-related lending until May 2008 
(includes TSLF). 
A.  August 2007: The initial shock 
The Federal Reserve initially responded to the turmoil in the inter-bank markets in 
August 2007 with the introduction of the Term Discount Window Program and a reduction in the 
price of primary credit through the Discount Window.
22  Specifically, on August 17, 2007, the 
term of primary credit was extended from overnight to as long as 30 days (later extended to 90 
days).  Moreover, the spread of the primary credit interest rate over the Federal Funds target rate 
was lowered from 100 to 50 basis points (and eventually to 25 basis points).  On the same day, 
the Federal Reserve also openly encouraged the use of the Discount Window by identifying such 
use as a sign of strength during a specially convened teleconference with a group of large banks 
and major investment banking firms (The Clearing House 2007).
23  Despite this initial activity, 
Discount Window borrowing was negligible during the second half of 2007.  By contrast, the 
FHLB System saw a brisk business: in August and September alone, the FHLB System lent out 
an additional $165 billion; and by the end of 2007 the level of outstanding advances was up $235 
billion.  
One explanation for the lack of Discount Window borrowing is the perception by 
potential borrowers that markets will view such borrowing very unfavorably.  In other words, 
that there is a “stigma” associated with borrowing from the Discount Window.
24  Figure 5 
                                                 
22 Primary credit is available to depository institutions in sound overall condition to meet short-term, backup funding 
needs at a price above the federal funds rate target.  Normally, primary credit will be granted on a “no-questions-
asked,” minimally administered basis. There are no restrictions on borrowers’ use of primary credit. 
23 Guerrerain (2007) reported that Deutsche Bank borrowed from the discount window on the day of the 
teleconference.  The following Wednesday, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Wachovia, and Citibank also each 
announced discount window borrowings of $500 million, including some on a term basis (Associated Press, 2007).  
24 Furfine (2003) documents a continued reluctance of banks to borrow from the Discount Window following the 
introduction of changes made to the facility in 2003 in order to reduce stigma.    20
illustrates this point by documenting the fraction of days in each month where the intraday high 
in the Federal Funds market (as reported by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York) is above the 
primary credit interest rate.  The figure provides data from January 2003 (when Discount 
Window policies were altered) through July 2008.  The fact that institutions are willing to pay 
more in the inter-bank market than the interest rate at which they could borrow directly from the 
Federal Reserve suggests there is some stigma associated with the Discount Window.  
While stigma is a compelling explanation of the data, the unwillingness of institutions to 
borrow from the Federal Reserve at the outset of the crisis can also be explained by the simple 
fact that FHLB advances were a less expensive option for domestic depository institutions.  The 
relative attractiveness of the Federal Reserve’s Discount Window vis-à-vis the FHLB System is, 
for the most part, driven by the spread between the primary credit rate and the short term 
advance rate.  However, differences in the haircuts applied across types of collateral, stock 
purchase requirements (and the associated dividends), and interest rate expectations all influence 
the cost of borrowing. 
Figure 6 provides the average weekly borrowing of primary credit from the Discount 
Window together with an estimated all-in cost spread between a 30-day Discount Window loan 
and a 30-day advance from the New York FHLB collateralized by a AAA-rated Federal Agency 
mortgage-backed security.  The method of deriving the respective all-in cost measures is 
provided in Appendix A.  According to this measure, the relative attractiveness of a 30-day 
advance from the New York FHLB averaged about 80 basis points between January 2003 and 
August 2007.
25  The attractiveness of the FHLB advance then fell to somewhere in the 20–40 
                                                 
25 Prior to January 2003, the interest rate charged at the Discount Window was typically 25-50 basis points below 
the federal funds rate.  While the below-market rate for Discount Window credit created incentives for an institution 
to borrow, regulation required institutions to first exhaust other available sources of funds and explain their need for 
credit.   21
basis point range following the Federal Reserve’s 50 basis point reduction in the spread of the 
primary credit rate over the federal funds rate target in August 2007. 
The FHLB System clearly played an important role as a government-sponsored source of 
liquidity during the first months of the liquidity crisis.  While the stigma associated with 
borrowing from the Federal Reserve’s Discount Window is one explanation for this fact, we 
document that FHLB members largely chose to simply borrow from the cheapest provider of 
funds. 
B.  December 2007: The TAF and Swap Lines with Foreign Central Banks 
Despite the unprecedented increase in FHLB advances during the fall of 2007, term funding 
markets remained stressed.  Figure 7 illustrates this by plotting the spread of one month LIBOR 
to the similar duration overnight indexed swap rate (OIS) between January 2007 and September 
2008.  This spread widened substantially in late 2007 and became a widely followed indicator of 
financial market stress.  
In order to better understand the limited effect of FHLB advances on the LIBOR-OIS 
interest rate spread, it is insightful to look at the panel of 16 banking organizations that are 
surveyed to measure U.S. term dollar LIBOR.
26  Table 6 lists these banking organizations s and 
indicates whether they have access to FHLB advances and/or the Federal Reserve’s Discount 
Window.  In the table, a banking organization is defined to have “direct access” to the FHLB 
System if it controls a U.S. depository institution that is a FHLB member and that member is 
large relative to the banking organization.  A banking organization is defined to have “indirect 
                                                 
26 The LIBOR panel is surveyed each morning (11:00 a.m. local time) by the British Bankers Association about the 
rate at which it could borrow funds were it to do so by asking for and then accepting inter-bank offers in reasonable 
market size just prior to 11:00 a.m.   Contributor panels comprise at least eight banks, and are intended to broadly 
reflect the balance of activity in the inter–bank deposit market.  Contributed rates are ranked in order and only the 
middle two quartiles averaged arithmetically. This average rate becomes the “LIBOR fixing” for that particular 
currency, maturity, and date.    22
access” if it controls a U.S. depository institution that is a FHLB member, but that member is 
small relative to the banking organization.  In practice, this excludes all foreign institutions that 
control a U.S.-based FHLB-member bank since the size of their U.S. operations is small relative 
to the consolidated institution by any reasonable measure of size.  Very few of the banking 
organizations participating in the LIBOR panel have direct access to the FHLB System.  
One natural question is whether access to low-cost secured term funding through the 
FHLBs affected the demand for unsecured term dollar funding in the inter-bank Eurodollar 
market.  As illustrated by Figure 8, banking organizations with direct FHLB access reported only 
0.07 basis points less on average than non-members for term LIBOR funding during the pre-
crisis period,.  However, during the post-crisis period, banking organizations with direct FHLB 
access reported 0.70 basis points less on average.
27  While this difference is economically small, 
it is statistically significant at the one percent level.  Moreover, it is a bit surprising to find any 
effect in the data at all given speculation in the business press that LIBOR panel banks were 
shading their quotes downward to avoid looking desperate for funding.  While access to FHLB 
advances is limited among the LIBOR panel contributors, Table 6 also illustrates that access to 
the Federal Reserve’s Discount Window is universal among this group of institutions.  This fact 
suggests that the Federal Reserve might have an in important role to play in moderating liquidity 
pressures by lending to institutions without access to the FHLB System, like foreign banks.  This 
was achieved through the introduction of the Term Auction Facility (TAF) in December 2007 
and reciprocal currency swaps with the European Central Bank and Swiss National Bank.   
The TAF facility provides credit to institutions with access to the Discount Window and 
against the same range of collateral, but at an auction-determined interest rate rather than the 
                                                 
27 During some of the most stressful times in the term dollar LIBOR market (e.g., December 2007), banking 
organizations participating on the LIBOR panel with direct access to FHLB advances were reporting paying about 
4.00 basis points less for unsecured funding than banks without such access.   23
administered primary credit rate.  It was believed that the use of a market interest rate instead of 
an administered penalty rate would reduce any stigma associated with borrowing from the 
facility (Armantier, Krieger and McAndrews 2008). The Federal Reserve’s swap lines with the 
European Central Bank and the Swiss National Bank allow U.S. dollars to be lent, on term, to 
foreign banks without access to the Discount Window or TAF.  The ability of these central banks 
to lend directly to foreign institutions against collateral at a price lower than the term dollar 
LIBOR rate would presumably reduce the demand for term unsecured dollar funding by foreign 
institutions in the Eurodollar market.   
In sum, the purpose of the TAF and swap lines was to increase U.S. dollar liquidity.  
However, the early evidence concerning the effectiveness is conflicting.
28  Taylor and Williams 
(2008) find that the daily LIBOR-OIS spreads (1-month and 3-month) are unaffected on TAF bid 
submission dates.  By contrast, Wu (2008) finds that these spreads have been significantly lower 
since the original announcement of the TAF program.  Finally, McAndrews, Sarkar, and Wang 
(2008) find that both TAF-related announcements and operations have significant effects on 
changes in the 3-month LIBOR-OIS spread.  The authors also conclude that announcements with 
regards to the European swap lines have a larger effect, consistent with our conjecture that non-
FHLB members were under greater stress in the LIBOR market.  
The introduction of the TAF and swap lines also had important implications for the 
relative attractiveness of FHLB advances since most FHLB members are eligible for the TAF.  
Figure 9 displays the all-in cost of borrowing via the TAF for each of the 30-day auctions since 
its inception in December 2007 through June 2008 relative to a 30-day advance from the New 
York FHLB (see Appendix A for our all-in cost measure for the TAF).  It illustrates that, with 
                                                 
28 The divergent results arise in part due the differences in the TAF-related announcements and operations examined 
and whether the level or changes in the LIBOR-OIS spread are affected.   24
the exception of the first two auctions, the TAF all-in cost was either on par with the FHLB or 
cheaper as a source of funding according to our measure through March 2008. However, this 
changed in a dramatic way in April when the all-in cost spread between the TAF and the FHLB 
rose to 52 basis points as liquidity pressure returned to unsecured term funding markets. Since, 
May 2008, the TAF has been a cheaper source of funding than FHLB advances, perhaps 
explaining the leveling-off of outstanding advances since March 2008 (see Figure 1). 
While the FHLB System was the lowest-cost source of secured term funding for U.S. 
depository institutions during fall 2007, the new liquidity facilities created by the Federal 
Reserve in December 2007 complemented FHLB advances by extending “stigma-free” term 
dollar credit to non-FHLB members, especially foreign institutions. 
C.  March 2008: Single-tranche OMO, TSLF, and PDCF 
Through the winter, liquidity pressures manifested themselves through the unwillingness 
of institutions to extend term unsecured credit.  However, by the spring of 2008, liquidity 
pressures began to infect the secured funding markets.  While pre-crisis Federal Agency repo 
interest rates averaged only nine basis points above Treasury repo spreads, these spreads had 
blown out into the 70-90 basis point range in early March.  As highly-leveraged users of repo 
credit, broker-dealers were hit especially hard by these liquidity pressures.  Notably, some of 
these institutions are owned by financial holding companies that are affiliated commercial banks.  
As discussed above, during the fall of 2007, the Federal Reserve granted a number of waivers of 
Section 23A restrictions on lending by banks to affiliates in order to permit banks to support the 
liquidity needs of their broker-dealer affiliates.  However, Table 7 documents that a number of 
large primary dealers did not have commercial banking affiliates, which limited their ability to 
deal with these liquidity problems internally.   25
The initial response of the Federal Reserve to alleviate these pressures was the 
introduction of the Single-Tranche Open Market Operation (Single-Tranche OMO) program on 
March 7, 2008.  Then on March 10, 2008 the Federal Reserve announced an expansion of its 
securities lending program, the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), to allow primary 
dealers to swap a range of securities (including AAA/Aaa-rated asset-backed securities) for U.S. 
Treasuries (for a fee).  However, liquidity pressures in secured funding markets worsened that 
week and the most highly-leveraged primary dealer, Bear Stearns, had to accept a buyout from 
JP Morgan Chase in order to avoid bankruptcy.
29  After Bear Stearns, the Federal Reserve 
expanded access to the Discount Window by creating the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF).  
The scale and scope of Federal Reserve lending increased significantly in March 2008 
with the introduction of the single-tranche OMO, the TSLF, and the PDCF.  Each of these 
facilities was designed to provide secured funding to primary dealers which did not have direct 
access to either FHLB advances or the Federal Reserve’s Discount Window.  
D.  July and September 2008: Concerns about Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
The reduction of the discount rate to 25 basis points over the federal funds target in 
March, 2008 established parity in terms of the all-in cost of Discount Window loans and FHLB 
advances (according to our measure). During the following months, the Discount Window 
became more attractive from a pricing perspective (see Figure 6).  An important reason for this 
was a negative change in investor attitudes towards Federal Agency debt issues, which raised 
their relative borrowing costs.  Moreover, in July 2008 concerns about the financial health for 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac led Congress to grant temporary authority to increase the lines of 
                                                 
29 In order to facilitate the takeover, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in consultation with the U.S. Treasury 
financed approximately $30 billion of assets from Bear Stearns via the Maiden Lane LLC. 
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credit for the housing GSEs to any amount deemed appropriate by the Secretary of U.S. 
Treasury.  The FHLB System in part found itself “guilty by association” and saw additional 
pressures in terms of funding.  
In September 2008, the Treasury announced a three-part plan aimed at stabilizing the 
residential mortgage finance market.  First, the regulator of all three housing GSEs, the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency, placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship.  Second, 
the Treasury established a Federal Agency MBS purchase program.  Finally, the Treasury 
announced the creation of a GSE credit facility for Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the FHLB 
System to be operated by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.  Such loans will be fully 
collateralized (using either Federal Agency MBS or FHLB advances) and priced at LIBOR plus 
50 basis points The direct effect of these three announcements was a marked tightening in the 
spreads between Federal Agency debt and mortgage-backed securities and comparable Treasury 
securities.  However, given the terms of Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's conservatorships; the 
debt spreads for these two GSEs tightened more than those offered by the  FHLB System. 
E.  The Balance Sheets’ of the FHLB System and the Federal Reserve 
While both the FHLB System and the Federal Reserve have lent significant sums (with 
interest and against collateral) during the financial crisis, there are important differences in terms 
of balance sheet mechanics.  As the FHLB System has increased lending, its balance sheet has 
expanded proportionately.  FHLB advances are funded with consolidated obligations plus capital 
stock that members are required to purchase as a condition of their advance borrowings.  Hence, 
the leverage of the FHLB System remained unchanged in the face of its tremendous growth 
during the second half of 2007.  
By contrast, the size of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet remained virtually unchanged 
through the August 2008, but the composition of assets was altered markedly.  The Federal   27
Reserve has lent out cash by either selling from its holdings of U.S. Treasuries or not 
replenishing its portfolio as issues matured.  Consequently, the Federal Reserve’s holdings of 
Treasury securities fell substantially over time (Figure 10).   
If not for the FHLB System, the Federal Reserve would likely have faced a significant 
demand for borrowing at the Discount Window in August 2007 and onwards.  In that case, the 
Federal Reserve would have had a very different balance sheet position when banks faced 
renewed liquidity pressures at the end of 2007 or primary dealers faced similar circumstances in 
March 2008.  Under the counter-factual experiment of all new FHLB lending having instead 
been delivered via the Discount Window and sterilized, the amount of unencumbered outright 
holdings of U.S. Treasury securities on the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet at the end of August 
2008 would have been below $100 billion.  Hence, this could have influenced the Federal 
Reserve’s design and funding of the various new liquidity facilities. Moreover, the 
Supplementary Financing Program and the authority to pay interest on reserves would likely 
have been enacted earlier.  
While the FHLB System played an important role as a government-sponsored liquidity 
provider for depository institutions during the second half of 2007, events in 2008 revealed an 
important limitation.  In particular, the Federal Agency debt markets saw spreads widen 
appreciably and little investor appetite for longer-dated issues.  Hence, relying on market funding 
using an implicit government guarantee may not be sufficient for a lender of last resort to be 
entirely effective during a financial crisis. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
The ongoing global financial crisis has provided an opportunity to learn about the roles of 
many often-overlooked financial institutions and financial markets.  The often-overlooked FHLB   28
System was one of the first institutions to emerge as an important provider of government-
sponsored liquidity.  Indeed, it was about eight months into the crisis before the Federal Reserve 
eclipsed the FHLB System in terms of crisis-related lending to the financial system.   
Nevertheless, the FHLB System remains, by far, the largest lender to U.S. depository institutions 
while most of the Federal Reserve’s liquidity operations have been for the benefit of non-
depository or foreign financial institutions.  Without the FHLB System, the Federal Reserve 
likely would have faced significant demand for borrowing at the Discount Window at a much 
earlier stage of the crisis.  
It is commonly noted that the structure of the current supervisory framework and safety 
net for U.S. financial institutions is antiquated and fragmented.  The lender of last resort 
framework is no exception in that regard.  Besides the Federal Reserve’s Discount Window (and 
related liquidity facilities) and the FHLB System, there also exists the Central Liquidity Facility 
for credit unions (managed by the federal credit union regulator, the National Credit Union 
Administration) and the credit facilities provided by the U.S. Treasury to each of the three 
housing GSEs.  Nevertheless, despite the institutional complexity of the existing lender of last 
resort framework, the ultimate lender of last resort is the U.S. Treasury and, by extension, the 
American taxpayers.  
The tremendous upheaval in global financial markets and the perceived ineffectiveness of 
U.S. financial regulation, suggests to us that it would be helpful for Congress to revisit the roles 
of the respective lender of last resort facilities. In particular, the fact that different lender of last 
resort facilities have at the same time complemented and competed with each other, raises 
important policy questions about which agencies of government should act as the lender of last 
resort and under what terms and conditions. The Federal Reserve’s and Treasury’s new, but 
ostensibly temporary, lending facilities of coupled with the recent proposal to anoint the Federal   29
Reserve as the “market stability regulator” (U.S. Treasury 2008) are clear indications of changes 
to come.     30
Appendix A: All-in Cost Measures 
 
A direct comparison of lending rates between the FHLB System and the Federal Reserve 
is complicated by several factors.  First, unlike within the Federal Reserve System, advance rates 
vary across individual FHLBs.  We choose the 30-day advance rate from the FHLB New York.  
Second, on the margin, any borrowing from a FHLB requires a simultaneous investment in 
capital stock.  Consistent with the FHLB New York, we assume that this activity requirement is 
4.5 percent of the borrowed amount and that this investment is financed at the one month LIBOR 
rate.  The stock investment, however, also earns dividends that we assume are six percent.   
Third, borrowings from the Discount Window can be prepaid (and hence the rate reset), while 
the rate on 30-day advances is fixed for the duration. We use the spread between the one month 
overnight index swap rate and the federal funds target to control for expected changes discount 
rate.  Fourth, while borrowings at both institutions have to be collateralized, the haircuts differ 
across collateral classes. The Discount Window haircuts have remained on unchanged since 
September 2006 whereas the FHLB New York adjusted its haircuts upwards in April of 2008.  In 
order to account for these factors, we computed the all-in costs for the Discount Window and the 
FHLB New York as:  
All-in cost at Discount Window  LIBOR FFR OIS PCR DW DW × + − + × − = α α ) ( ) 1 (    (1) 
         All-in cost at TAF  LIBOR FFR OIS TAF DW DW × + − + × − = α α ) ( ) 1 (    (2) 
All-in cost at FHLB New York  DIV LIBOR FHLBNY FHLB FHLB × − × + + × − = θ θ α α ) ( ) 1 (  (3) 
where αDW: Discount Window haircut (7 percent) , αFHLB: FHLB New York haircut  = 10 percent 
(12 percent after April 9
th, 2008)), PCR: The primary credit rate (discount rate), TAF: Stop out 
rate from TAF, LIBOR: London interbank offer rate (one month, USD), FHLBNY: Federal Home 
Loan Bank of New York 30 day advance rate, OIS: Overnight index swap rate (one month USD),   31
FFR: Federal funds rate target, θ: Capital stock purchase activity requirement (4.5 percent), DIV: 
Dividend rate (6.0 percent). 
  For illustrative purposes, in Table A1 below, we compute the all-in cost measures using 
data from September 11, 2007.  We focus on a AAA-rated Federal Agency mortgage-backed 
security with a market value of $1 million that needs to be financed for one month. The all-in 
cost at the FHLB New York was 5.08 percent compared to the lending rate at 5.01 percent – a 
difference of seven basis points. At the time the primary credit rate stood at 5.75 but less than a 
week later the federal funds rate target was lowered by 50 basis points. The OIS indicated that 
the federal funds rate, on average, would be 34 basis points lower over the next month.  Hence, 
the all-in expected cost of the discount window was 5.41 percent implying a spread in all-in costs 
between FHLB New York and the discount window of 33 basis points in favor of FHLB New 
York.   
Table A1: All-in Cost Measure Computation 
30-day Advance from FHLB New York versus 30-day Loan from Federal Reserve Discount Window 
Data for September 11, 2007 
 
30-day loan/advance  FHLB New York  Discount Window 
AAA-rated Agency MBS collateral pledged  1,000,000  1,000,000 
Haircut 10%  7% 
Advance (subtotal)  900,000  930,000 
Activity Stock Purchase Requirement  4.50%  NA 
Stock purchase  40,500  NA 
Remaining left to fund  140,500  70,000 
Lending rate  5.01  5.75 
1-month LIBOR  5.80  5.80 
Dividend rate  6.00  NA 
One month OIS - Federal Funds Target  NA  -0.34 
All-in cost  5.08  5.41 
Source: Bloomberg and authors’ calculations       32
Table 1: Federal Home Loan Bank Size and Membership by District as of 12/31/2007 




Membership Concentration                  
(Five Largest Members)  
  $ Billion    Share of Capital  Share of Advances 
Atlanta  $189.7 1,217  47.3%  55.2% 
Boston  $78.3 457  52.3%  61.2% 
Chicago  $89.1 841  30.0%  42.1% 
Cincinnati  $87.5 725  50.5%  61.9% 
Dallas  $63.6 886  49.5%  58.7% 
Des Moines  $60.8 1,243  47.9%  51.6% 
Indianapolis  $56.1 421  48.3%  57.2% 
New York  $109.7 291  47.4%  48.3% 
Pittsburgh  $101.2 332  66.7%  72.2% 
San Francisco  $323.0 405  74.9%  79.0% 
Seattle  $64.2 380  58.0%  70.5% 
Topeka  $55.4 877  41.0%  53.3% 
Source: Federal Home Loan Banks 2007 Combined Financial Report, authors’ calculations   33
 
Table 2: Federal Home Loan Bank System Combined Balance Sheet as of 12/31/2007 
  Amount 
($ Billions)  Share of Assets (%) 
Assets    
     Advances  $875.1  68.7 
     Cash & Investments  299.0  23.4 
     Mortgage Loans (Net)  $91.6  7.2 
     Other Assets  $8.8  0.7 
          Total Assets  $1,274.5  100.0 
      
Liabilities and Capital:    
     Consolidated Obligations (Net)  $1,178.9  92.5 
     Other Liabilities  $42.0  3.3 
     Membership Capital Stock  $50.3  3.9 
     Retained Earnings  $3.7  0.3 
     Other Comprehensive Income  ($0.4)  0.0 
          Total Liabilities and Capital  $1,274.5  100.0 
            Source: Federal Home Loan Banks 2007 Combined Financial Report, authors’ calculations   34
 











Q2 2007             Q4 2007 
 $  Billions  Percent 
 Washington Mutual                    42.4             63.9        325.8                    6.9           19.6  
 Bank of America                   25.5             57.2     1,667.4                    2.2             3.4  
 Countrywide, FSB                   18.9             47.7        121.1                  28.9           39.4  
 Merrill Lynch                    11.7             11.7        115.8                      -             10.1  
 Wachovia Corp.                   11.3             41.9        740.8                    4.5             5.7  
 Wells Fargo & Co                   11.1             11.3        529.8                    0.0             2.1  
 Citigroup                     8.3           102.0     1,351.3                    7.6             7.6  
 PNC                     7.3               8.7        131.2                    1.2             6.6  
 Capital One                     5.9               6.8        132.3                    0.7             5.2  
 US Bank                      5.7             17.2        238.4                    5.1             7.2  
 Total/Average                 148.1           368.3     5,354.0                    4.6             6.9  
Note: Merill Lynch = Merrill Lynch Bank USA and Merrill Lynch Bank & Trust Co., FSB 
Source: Call and Thrift reports 
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Table 4: Aggregate Call and Thrift Reports 
Panel A. Q1 2006 to Q2 2007 (average quarterly growth rate and change) 

















Assets         
Cash 3.96%  3.99%  0.08%  3.09%  0.52%  -0.04% 
Securities 15.07%  0.12%  -0.24% 17.77% -0.46%  -0.44% 
Fed Funds and Repos  5.10%  1.78%  0.00%  1.89%  1.76%  0.00% 
Trading Assets  7.21%  5.90%  0.27%  0.13%  55.79%  0.02% 
Total Loans  58.82%  1.45%  -0.14%  71.31%  2.50%  0.41% 
Mortgage Loans  35.24%  1.33%  -0.12%  56.18%  2.54%  0.34% 
Non-Mortgage Loans  24.20%  1.59%  -0.02%  15.94%  2.32%  0.06% 
Total Assets     1.68%        1.91%    
Liabilities            
Deposits 62.01%  1.77%  0.05%  78.29%  1.94%  0.02% 
Fed Funds and Repos  7.94%  1.54%  -0.01%  2.80%  3.06%  0.03% 
Trading Liabilities  3.07%  1.45%  -0.01%  0.01%  38.45%  0.00% 
Other Borrowing  11.44%  1.18%  -0.06%  7.79%  0.45%  -0.12% 
Of Which: FHLB Advances  4.94%  0.37%  -0.07%  7.54%  0.23%  -0.13% 
Panel B. Q3 2007 (actual quarterly growth rate and change) 

















Assets            
Cash  3.65% -2.42%  -0.24%  2.84%  -6.12%  -0.24% 
Securities  14.15% 0.35%  -0.51%  17.63%  2.38%  0.13% 
Fed Funds and Repos  5.38% 10.19%  0.30%  1.62%  -7.04%  -0.15% 
Trading Assets  7.69% 10.16%  0.43%  0.11%  -10.77%  -0.02% 
Total Loans  58.92% 3.40%  -0.32%  71.83%  1.88%  0.17% 
Mortgage Loans  34.76% 1.66%  -0.79%  56.76%  1.96%  0.17% 
Non-Mortgage Loans  24.82% 6.10%  0.50%  15.90%  1.62%  0.00% 
Total Assets   3.97%      1.65%   
 Liabilities          
Deposits  60.82% 2.05%  -1.15%  77.41%  0.53%  -0.86% 
Fed Funds and Repos  7.28% -4.59%  -0.65%  2.73%  4.99%  0.09% 
Trading Liabilities  3.36% 13.74%  0.29%  0.01%  11.63%  0.00% 
Other Borrowing  13.13% 18.85%  1.64%  8.51%  9.24%  0.59% 
Of Which: FHLB Advances  6.33% 31.68%  1.33%  8.26%  9.07%  0.56% 
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Panel C. Q3 2007 (actual quarterly growth rate and change) 
















 Assets        
Cash  3.79% 6.51% 0.14% 3.12%  11.72%  0.27% 
Securities  13.37% -2.86% -0.75% 17.35% 0.39%  -0.31% 
Fed Funds and Repos  5.89% 12.40% 0.52%  1.59% -2.27% -0.07% 
Trading Assets  8.25% 9.86% 0.55% 0.09%  -11.03%  -0.01% 
Total Loans  58.79% 2.28% -0.16% 71.83% 2.32%  0.09% 
Mortgage Loans  34.34% 1.36% -0.41% 56.84% 2.43%  0.13% 
Non-Mortgage Loans  25.22% 4.05%  0.36% 15.84% 2.06% -0.02% 
Total Assets   2.57%    2.20%  
 Liabilities          
Deposits  61.08% 3.05%  0.29% 76.77% 1.28% -0.70% 
Fed Funds and Repos  7.21%  1.57%  -0.07%  2.96%  11.77%  0.25% 
Trading  Liabilities  3.34% 2.00% -0.02% 0.01% 6.50% 0.00% 
Other Borrowing  13.20%  3.05%  0.06%  9.00%  8.91%  0.55% 
Of Which: FHLB Advances  6.43%  3.96%  0.09%  8.75%  9.19%  0.56% 
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Table 5: Changes in the Correlation of FHLB Advances with Balance Sheet Items 
 








1. Large Institution  -0.003 -0.002 -0.000 
  (0.001)*** (0.002) (0.002) 
           
2. (Change in Cash)/Assets  0.304 0.498 0.368 
  (0.007)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** 
           
3. Large*(Change in Cash)/Assets  0.038 -0.287 -0.158 
  (0.099) (0.165)*  (0.205) 
           
4. (Change in Fed Funds and Repos)/Assets  0.385 0.433 0.392 
  (0.006)*** (0.012)*** (0.013)*** 
           
5. Large*(Change in Fed Funds and Repos)/Assets  -0.317 0.150  -0.321 
  (0.045)*** (0.084)*  (0.084)*** 
           
6. (Change in Trading Assets)/Assets  0.051 0.287 0.139 
  (0.018)*** (0.123)**  (0.107) 
           
7. Large*(Change in Trading Assets)/Assets  0.154 0.117  -0.149 
  (0.101) (0.319) (0.181) 
           
8. (Change in Mortgage Loans)/Assets  0.506 0.587 0.521 
  (0.005)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** 
           
9. Large*(Change in Mortgage Loans)/Assets  -0.109 0.068  -0.287 
  (0.034)*** (0.054)  (0.087)*** 
           
10. (Change in Non-Mortgage Loans)/Assets  0.483 0.566 0.517 
  (0.007)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** 
           
11. Large*(Change in Non-Mortgage Loans)/Assets  -0.387 -0.770 -0.305 
  (0.050)*** (0.187)*** (0.110)*** 
           
12. (Change in Funding)/Assets  -0.451 -0.508 -0.470 
  (0.004)*** (0.009)*** (0.010)*** 
           
13. Large*(Change in Funding)/Assets  0.231 0.007 0.251 
  (0.032)*** (0.057)  (0.081)*** 
           
14. Observations  21,593 4,379 4,473 
           
15. R-squared  0.38 0.48 0.42 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   38
 
Table 6: LIBOR Panel Banks and their Access to FHLB Advances and the Discount 
Window 
 
Libor Panel  FHLB Member?  Discount Window 
Bank of America  Yes  Yes 
Bank of Tokyo - Mistubishi UFJ  Union Bank of CA  Union Bank of CA 
Barclays Bank plc  No  Yes 
Citibank NA  Yes  Yes 
Credit Suisse  No  Yes 
Deutsche Bank AG  No  Yes 
HBOS No  Yes 
HSBC  HSBC Bank USA, NA  HSBC Bank USA, NA 
JP Morgan Chase  Yes  Yes 
Lloyds TSB Bank plc  No  Yes 
Rabobank Rabobank,  NA  Yes 
Royal Bank of Canada  RBC Centura  Yes 
The Norinchukin Bank  No  Yes 
The Royal Bank of Scotland Group 
Citizens Bank of 
Pennsylvania and RBS 
Citizens, NA  Yes 
UBS AG  No  Yes 
West LB AG  No  Yes 
Source: British Banker’s Association, Federal Home Loan Bank System, and Call and Thrift Reports.  Membership 
measured over the period July 2007 through March 2008 
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Table 7: Primary Dealers 
 
Primary Dealers  Commercial bank affiliate?  Section 23A waiver 
BNP Paribas Securities Corp  Foreign bank  No 
Banc of America Securities LLC  US Depository institution  Yes 
Barclays Capital Inc.  Foreign bank  Yes 
Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc  No  No 
Cantor Fitzgerald & Co.  No  No 
Citigroup Global Markets, Inc  US Depository institution  Yes 
Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC  Foreign bank  No 
Daiwa Securities America Inc.  Foreign bank  No 
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc  Foreign bank  Yes 
Dresdner Kleinwort Securities Inc  Foreign bank  No 
Goldman, Sachs, & Co.  No  No 
Greenwich Capital Markets, Inc.  Foreign bank  Yes 
HSBC Securities (USA) Inc.  Foreign bank  No 
J.P. Morgan Securities, Inc.  US Depository institution  Yes 
Lehman Brothers, Inc.  No  No 
Merrill Lynch Government Securities Inc.  US Depository institution  No 
Mizuho Securities USA Inc  Foreign bank  No 
Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc  US Depository institution  Yes 
UBS Securities  Foreign bank  No 






















   
Source: Office of Finance  





















LIBOR 1M ABCP AA 30 day  FHLB NY Advance 30 day
 
Source: Office of Finance, Bloomberg 








Jan 06 Jul 06 Jan 07 Jul 07 Jan 08 Jul 08
FHLB New Advances since July 31, 2007
Federal Reserve LoLR (funds)












Source: Weekly average values from Federal Reserve Board H.4.1. Release; Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York; and Federal Home Loan Banks Office of Finance 
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Figure 5: Fraction of Days Where Federal Funds Intraday High Exceeds  
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Source: Federal Reserve Board H.4.1. release, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
and the Office of Finance 
 
Figure 6: Discount Window Borrowings and Spread in All-in Costs between the  






















































Source: LIBOR bids from Reuters; FHLB membership from Call and Thrift Reports, FHLB websites, National Information Center 
 
    Figure 8: Non-FHLB Member less Full Member 1-Month Dollar LIBOR Bids,  
Daily Observations, January 2007 to August 2008 



































Primary Credit Rate TAF Stop Out Rate All-Cost Spread bwt. TAF and FHLB NY (right axis)  
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Bloomberg, Authors calculations 
 
Figure 9: Primary Credit Rate, TAF Stop-Out Rate and All-in Cost Spread  
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Source: Federal Reserve Board H.4.1 release and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
 
Figure 10: Federal Reserve Domestic Financial Assets    45
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